Abstract-C ompliance with regulatory policies on data remains a ke y hurdle to cloud computing. Policies such as EU privac y , HIPAA, and PCI-DSS place requirements on data availabilit y , integrit y , migration, retention, and access, among man y others. This paper proposes a polic y management service that offers scalable management of data retention policies attached to data obj ects stored in a cloud environment. The management service includes a highl y available and secure encr y ption ke y store to manage the encr y ption ke y s of data obj ects. By deleting the encr y ption ke y at a specified retention time associated with the data obj ect, we effectivel y delete the data obj ect and its copies stored in online and offline environments. To achieve scalabilit y , our service uses Hadoop MapReduce to perform parallel management tasks, such as data encr y ption and decr y ption, ke y distribution and retention polic y enforcement. A protot y pe deplo y ed in a 16-machine Linux cluster currentl y supports 56 MB/sec for encr y ption, 76 MB/sec for decr y ption, 31,000 retention policies/sec read and 15,000 retention policies/sec write.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a promising paradigm to offer IT cost reductions and business agility improvements. However, compliance with regulatory policies still remains a key hurdle to wide adoption of cloud computing. The service environment has to manage data owned by the customers according to mutually agreed data management policies in order to ensure compliance with regulatory policies such as the Data Protection Directive under EU privacy law [11] , HIPAA [16] , and PC 1-DSS [20] . These regulatory policies are often translated to enforceable or auditable actions, such as data availability, data integrity, data migration, data retention, and data access.
Although these regulatory compliance requirements are not new and have been addressed in traditional enterprise computing environments, addressing them in the context of cloud services introduces new challenges, one of which is scalable management and enforcement of policies. Imagine a backup service that offers data retention to 300 enterprises, with each enterprise having 10 4 users, and each user owninfi 10 5 files. Such a service must be capable of managing 3xlO
files. If each file is encrypted with a 32-byte key, the key store itself will require over 10 TB. A service capable of managing medical records for the entire U.S. population of 300 million people, with each person owning 10 3 records requires the same scale.
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Our objective is to build a scalable polic � management service with the ultimate goal of managing 10 I data objects. This paper details the design and prototype implementation of a policy management service that is primarily focused on data retention. Data retention belongs to a class of data policies called action policies that specify what to do (the action) under the current situation [18] . We believe that other policies such as data backup, data archiving, and data migration [4, 5] , can be expressed in action policies and enforced similarly.
Managing data policies at scale poses various challenges, including the following two that we believe are key challenges to managing data retention policies:
• Scalable Policy Enforcement: A scalable engine that supports policy enforcement in real time for data access, and updates at the rate at which data changes is required. State information [23] and contextual information associated with data objects need to be tracked for policy enforcement. Enforcement needs to be carried out reliably as machine failure in large systems is common.
•
High
Availability and Security of Management Metadata: Policy management related metadata, which can include data management artifacts like encryption keys, audit logs [2] , state and context information for policy decisions, should be treated as being as critical as the data being managed. High security and high availability of such management related metadata are actually required by regulatory compliance policies such as HIPAA and PCI-DSS.
Additional challenges include, for example, how to manage scalable relationships defmed among data policies, among data objects, and between data policies and data objects. Runtime correlation and decision making require complex data/policy relationships be captured thoroughly, structured efficiently, and evaluated quickly. Yet another challenge is to handle multi tenancy. The volume of customers introduces a new dimension of complexity and scalability. A common policy management service needs to manage customer specific and data specific policies. Because data retention policies are rather simple in relationship expression and policy evaluation, this paper will not focus on how these additional challenges are addressed in managing data retention policies.
In our data retention management service, each file can be associated with a retention policy. An inter-data-center secure and reliable encryption key store holds encryption keys for each file under retention management. The encryption key controls the lifetime of the file. By removing the encryption key, all the file copies in online and offline environments become unrecoverable. Our policy store, encryption key store, and other data management metadata stores, are implemented with a scalable structured data store [6, 15] . To achieve scalable management, the data management tasks, which include encryption and decryption, key distribution and policy enforcement, are performed concurrently in a machine cluster with the MapReduce framework [9, 14] . The prototyped cloud service has been deployed on a 16-machine Linux cluster with 128 cores (8 cores per machine), which supports 56 MB/sec for encryption, 76 MB/sec for decryption, 31,000 retention policies/sec read and 15,000 retention policies/sec write.
With respect to the two key challenges identified earlier, our data retention management service demonstrates that:
• Policy management at scale requires metadata management at scale. We have developed a highly available and highly secure cross-data-center encryption key store as a part of the policy management service to specifically manage encryption keys, a particular type of metadata essential to control data lifetime and data access.
• During policy enforcement and management task execution, failures can happen and leave behind corrupted data objects and policy enforcement states as side-effects.
Such side-effects cannot be handled automatically by built-in recovery capabilities of Hadoop MapReduce. We developed a state-aware retry execution scheme to implement the Map and Reduce functions of each policy management task. This recovery scheme allows execution to continue in the next round from the recorded persistent state and does not rely on transactional support, which can significantly reduce overall system scalability.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the retention management system. Section III shows the architecture of the management system, and how Hadoop and Map Reduce are used to perform management tasks.
Section IV details our design of the highly secure and available encryption key store. Section V shows how various failure scenarios are handled. Section VI reports our prototype's run time environment and performance measurements. We contrast our management service with related systems in Section VII and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II.

DATA RETENTION MANAGEMENT
Corporate data retention policies demand that enterprise data should remain accessible up to a certain time, and afterwards be deleted permanently with no recoverable trace.
Timely removal not only allows the enterprise to manage sensitive data in compliance with regulatory policies, but also reduces storage costs of ever-growing data [7] .
Many solutions exist for record retention [4, 5, 17] , but none has been demonstrated at the scale we envision.
Furthermore, two key pitfalls have not been addressed in existing solutions. First, current solutions frequently ignore off site data on removable media such as tapes. Tracking and managing such off-site information assets is challenging, and often becomes the root cause of data breaches to sensitive data.
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Secondly, ensuring deletion of data becomes hard once data is replicated to mUltiple storage tiers or sites to achieve high availability [4, 5] . Often there is no central point of control that can guarantee deletion of all copies at the proper time.
Data Retention Management System Figure I . Data retention policy management for file-based data. Figure 1 shows a file-based retention management system that addresses the above two concerns. We encrypt data at rest, and use the encryption key to control the lifetime of the file object, as introduced in [3] . By centrally managing encryption keys, the service can effectively manage both on-line and off line files. Once an encryption key is destroyed, all on-line and off-line copies become instantaneously unrecoverable. This mechanism both protects data against breaches, and provides an effective way of making off-site data unusable.
Data sources synchronize their data with the Online File System. Each file is encrypted by the Encryption Engine with a unique symmetric key for the life of the file. The encrypted files are stored online for fast retrieval. They can be further archived to offline media if their access becomes infrequent, but due to retention policies, they still need to be preserved for a long time (e.g., medical images often must be kept for more than ten years). The Key Management System provides a highly secure and available key store to hold the encryption keys. The key store itself is never backed up to offline media to ensure that keys that are destroyed are unrecoverable.
A data retention policy object is created in the Policy Repository when the file is uploaded to the management system. A retention policy can be specified in one of two simple formats: an absolute future time instant when the retention time expires, or the time duration to retain the data after the last data update. The Policy Enforcer periodically scans the Policy Repository to determine keys with expired retention times, and deletes them from the key store. Other policy enforcement actions can include the removal of the encrypted file from the Online File System to reclaim the storage, and notification of the deletion action to the file owner.
Garbage collection of the files can be achieved through a file removal API. Since all files are encrypted, the Online File System can be outsourced to a less secure environment such as Amazon's S3 store [1] .
III.
SERVICE ARCHITECTURE FOR DATA RETENTION
We developed our retention service using Hadoop A.
File Encryption Controller
The implementation of the File Encryption Controller is shown in Figure 3 . After the file is uploaded and stored in 
B. Concurrent and Batch Oriented Controller Execution
The task controllers submit their MapReduce jobs to the shared machine cluster concurrently, and are scheduled using the fair scheduler in Hadoop [14] . Each task controller is assigned its own unique pool. The weight assigned to each pool depends on how time sensitive the management task is. The fair scheduler relies on the weights to allocate MapReduce tasks and ensures that resources are distributed fairly between the task controllers.
MapReduce is inherently batch oriented, and therefore the service access APIs exposed by the architecture in Figure 2 are also batch oriented. Asynchronous processing is not an issue for archival solutions. To support real-time synchronous access for interactive applications such as browsing medical records, the HDFS that serves as the transient file store can cache original files or recently decrypted files. A slight modification of the architecture is needed to support on-demand file retrieval with synchronous (rather than batch-oriented) file decryption.
IV.
ENCRYPTION KEy STORE
The encryption key store is the most important component in our management service. This section presents the design of a highly secure and highly available encryption key store.
Having an encryption key store only hosted in the service data center where the retention management service is hosted, introduces a single point of failure and vulnerability. Instead, in our management service, encryption keys are partitioned into key fragments through polynomial secret sharing [22] , and distributed to different key fragment stores at different data centers called key distribution data centers.
In the encryption key store, each managed object is referenced by a unique Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). The key store is a key-value store that consists of a tuple with the object URI as the key, and the encryption key EK as the value, denoted by <URI, EK>. The encryption key EK; for a file named by URI; is partitioned into n key fragments, i.e., EKi .I' EK;,2, ... , EKi,n' Each key fragment is sent to one of n key distribution data centers, along with URI;. That is, the j-th key distribution data center hosts the encryption key fragment store for the encryption key EK;, denoted by <URI;, EKi,j>. The service data center can reconstruct the encryption key EK;, based on a sufficiently large subset {EK;,)' ... EK;,k} returned from k of the n key distribution data centers, where k < n. At the j-th key distribution data center, each pair of <URI;, EK;/ is stored in a scalable structured data store.
Use of the polynomial secret sharing scheme [22] makes the key store both highly available and highly secure. Only k of n key fragments are necessary to reconstruct the key, even if some distribution data centers are down. An intruder will need access to at least k independent data centers to collect the necessary key fragments to reconstruct the key. On the other hand, if the intruder deliberately destroys some of the key fragments, key fragments from non-compromised key distribution data centers allow successful key reconstruction.
Finally, no master keys are required to secure the key store itself, making maintenance of the key store simpler.
A.
Secure Key Distribution
Secure key distribution between the service data center and key distribution data centers is shown in Figure 4 . Message exchange between the service data center and the key distribution data centers can be achieved via a scalable message queue mechanism, or a remote procedure call (RPC) based protocol such as web services.
In the service data center, once user data is encrypted, the encryption key is temporarily stored in the Transient Encryption Key Store. The Cross Data-Center Key Distributor takes the key that is newly inserted in this transient store and partitions it into key fragments. At the j-th key distribution data center, the Cross Data-Center Key Distributer receives the key distribution message and stores the fragment EK;,j in its key fragment store as <URI;, EK;j> for the data object with URI;
Once the key distribution to all data centers is successfully acknowledged, EK; is removed from the Transient Encryption Key Store and subsequently, the user object (in plain-text) is deleted and only the encrypted object remains.
Due to machine or network failure, the message sent to the key distribution data centers may not always be acknowledged B.
Key Reconstruction
The Cross Data Center Key Reconstructor in the service data center issues the key reconstruction message to key distribution data centers that hold relevant key fragments. Once a sufficient number of key distribution data centers respond with the stored encryption key fragments, the service data center can reconstruct the encryption key. Because the communication delay between two data centers within the same geographical zone is small, to support fast key reconstruction, the key distribution data centers located within the same geographic zone as the service data center can be assigned to hold a sufficient number of key fragments to reconstruct an encryption key under normal conditions. However, to protect against natural disasters, a sufficient number of key fragments are also required to be distributed to key distribution data centers in other geographical regions, to facilitate key reconstruction only from the fragments held by cross-region key distribution data centers.
C. Key Deletion
The service data center receives a key deletion request either because the corresponding data's retention time expires, or because the data owner explicitly requests permanent data destruction. The request is stored in the Cross-Data-Center Key Destructor in the service data center and the request is returned. The key deletion request is then broadcast to all key distribution data centers to remove the key fragments that they hold. A batch processing task can be implemented with
MapReduce and incorporated into the key management task controller to handle key destruction. The key destructor is responsible for ensuring that a sufficient number of fragments are eventually successfully deleted.
V. FAILURE RECOVERY
The traditional data analysis related jobs conducted on a In this section, we examine how our management task controllers can be designed to tolerate failures within
MapReduce by using the File Encryption Controller shown in Figure 3 as an illustrative example.
File Encryption Map and Reduce Execution Steps
In the distributed workflow shown in Figure 3 , a file denoted as F is initially stored in the HDFS after being uploaded to our management service. F-HDFS denotes the file stored in HDFS and F-Local denotes the file stored on a local task execution machine. F-Encrypted-Local denotes the encrypted file stored on a local machine and F-Encrypted HDFS denotes the encrypted file stored in the HDFS. The Map Task is implemented in the following steps:
(Ml) Download F-HDFS to the scheduled task execution machine's local temp directory to become F-Local. with Hashp.
The integrity checking step is designed to protect against data corruption due to transient errors. The original file can be safely removed from the persistent store, only if the stored encrypted file F-Encrypted-HDFS can be successfully decrypted with data integrity guaranteed. This checking process slows down the overall file encryption, because it involves both encryption and decryption.
B.
Failure Recovery for File Encryption
The baseline mechanism to address failures is through retry of file encryption in the distributed workflow shown in Figure   3 that centers on the Encryption Pending Queue. If the encryption fails and no successful encryption status is updated, at the next scanning of the encryption pending queue, the file without successful encryption status is put back into the to-be encrypted file. File encryption is then repeated at one of the cluster machines through MapReduce, until the maximum number of retries is exceeded and the failure status is recorded to the status tracking table.
Our failure recovery mechanism also takes advantage of the two features provided by the structured data store such as
HBase. First, any data update to a given row is atomic and second, data updates to the same row are idempotent, because inherently the data store is a key-value store with a unique key for each row. Furthermore, a structured data store such as
HBase is built to be highly available, and the store can self-heal should an internal failure occur. The internal failure states are invisible externally to the client. Due to atomic and idempotent row-based update, updating a data store multiple times is not a problem. A permanent failure (e.g., due to the broken communication link) is detected by the Hadoop job tracker through a heartbeat protocol. As a result, the Map task that has not fmished will be re-Iaunched on a different machine that is reachable by the Hadoop job tracker.
When the Map task is re-Iaunched, the same file input that records the to-be-encrypted file list is re-submitted. Some of the listed files may have already been successfully encrypted.
We need to determine whether a file has been successfully encrypted by checking both the encryption status tracking 
VI. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS
We have prototyped the retention management service in a cluster for crypto processing. This strategy allocates 75% of computational capacity per machine for crypto processing and it is dependent on the actual cluster configuration. For example, in a 4-core machine cluster, if we want to reserve 2 cores per machine for non-encryption tasks, only 50% computational capacity will be allocated for encryption, because the Hadoop configuration has to be changed to allow at maximum 2 concurrent encryption tasks per machine.
Retention Policies Read, Write, and Scan. We focused our performance measurement only on the backend service.
The test clients run on the same machine cluster. Our first measurement is the read/write throughput of data retention policies. The URI of each fIle is randomly generated. Each fIle is associated with a data retention policy stating at a future time instant when the fIle should be deleted (e.g., 10 years after the fIle is created). The policy object encodes only the string representation of the specified time stamp and thus is very small. We pre-populated the HBase table with over 20 million policy objects, with each region server holding at least 4 regions, to ensure good load balancing among all the HBase region servers. In our cluster, we obtained 31,000 reads/sec and 15,000 writes/sec. The read performance is better than the write performance, as most of the reads are through the in-memory caches on the region servers [6, 15] . A 4GB heap size is allocated to each of the 15 HBase region servers. We estimate that the entire cluster should be able to hold 500 million policy objects in the combined in-memory caches.
We built a MapReduce-based scanner to scan the policy repository with about 125 million objects. The total scan took 1038 seconds. Based on this processing speed, the cluster will need 2.3 hours to scan 1 billion policy objects to determine which data objects have expired retention times.
File Encryption/Decryption. The second measurement that we did is on throughput of encryption and decryption. Our implementation used AES 256 encryption provided by the standard Sun JDK 1.6 distribution's crypto library. In our cluster, we achieved encryption throughput of 56 MB/sec and decryption throughput of 76 MB/sec. The measurement was taken after uploading 18,000 fIles, with each fIle having a fixed size of 2 MB. Thus we encrypted 36 GB in total. Our MapReduce Input Format [14] is designed so that the total encryption (or decryption) load contributed from all the 18,000 fIles is evenly distributed to each cluster machine and each machine has its maximum assigned number of cores (i.e., 6 cores) launched for encryption (or decryption). The encryption is slower than the decryption as our fIle encryption task involves fIle decryption to ensure data integrity.
To examine how encryption/decryption engine handles different fIle sizes, the measurement was repeated with a different fixed fIle size Sd (across all the uploaded fIles), that is, 0.25MB, 0.5 MB, 1 MB, 4 MB, in addition to 2 MB, while keeping the same total number of fIles, N (N=18,000), loaded in the cluster. To simulate heavy traffic from service front ends, the fIles were uploaded simultaneously by 5 concurrent test clients in each of the 16 cluster machines (i.e., each test client had 225 fIles to upload). Table 1 shows the total time spent on encryption (denoted by Te) and decryption (denoted by Td), and the measured throughput for encryption (Ce) and for decryption (Cd), given the input file size Sd. Ce is defmed as the total file content (denoted by L, L=NxSd) to be uploaded, over the encryption time measured (Te). Cd is defmed similarly. Table 1 shows that when the input file size is small (less than 1 MB), the encryption or decryption throughput is much smaller than the one measured from input file sizes larger than 1 MB, indicating that our encryption/decryption engine is not efficient for small files. Shown in Section V, an encryption task execution consists of the steps that carry out crypto processing (i.e., encryption and hashing), and the steps that involve network file transfer to/from HDFS. Network file transfer is the overhead in throughput measurement and HDFS is designed for large files [13, 14] . When the files are small, such transfer overhead is significant, compared to the time for file encryption/decryption related operations. Table 1 also shows that after the file size reaches 1 MB, the encryption/decryption throughput becomes much less sensitive to the file size. A policy-based management framework for the SAN-based file system is reported in [25] . File-based lifecycle related policies such as data migration are enforced by the metadata server cluster. The machine cluster in our policy management service serves the same role as the metadata server cluster. The key difference is that we use a common Hadoop and MapReduce framework to perform parallel enforcement actions with failure recovery being considered. We have not found other published papers on policy management at the scale we are working at (100 million or more policy objects).
The policy-based architecture reported in [25] is the closest we have found, where from the reported results, the performance was focused on policy caching at up to lOOK objects. irregularly. In contrast, our encryption key store is designed to be part of the management service where the key distribution data centers are under our control, and key operations are monitored. Moreover, Vanish relies on the un-guaranteed short-lived nature of the encryption key stored in public DHTs, and key operations cannot be monitored, whereas our system requires verifiable key deletion for compliance purposes.
The Revocable Backup system [3] encrypts files with secret keys. A master key encrypts the key file (in which all keys are stored) before the key file backup. File revocation is guaranteed by removing its encryption key and forgetting the master key of the key file. Our system design adopts the same concept of using an encryption key to control the lifetime of a file, but focuses on managing the large collection of files in a centralized and scalable manner. Furthermore, our system does not need a master key to protect the key store, and the key store is designed to be highly available and highly secure, without the need to be backed up.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a data-retention policy management service, the first step towards building a scalable policy-aware policy management service that ultimately aims to support lOll data objects and conform to compliance and regulatory policies. The service architecture is horizontally scalable. The data-retention service relies on a reliable and secure encryption key store that spans multiple data centers to store the encryption keys of data objects under management. The curr ent system relies on Hadoop and Map Reduce that are commonly available in a cloud-based environment to perform batch processing over a machine cluster for management tasks.
We are currently developing the client application to interact with the retention management service, and a retention policy administrator that allows retention policies to be defined and examined. We are experimenting with a hybrid private/public cloud deployment environment, in which the public cloud environment provides outsourced storage for encrypted files. We are also planning to extend the policy management framework beyond data retention, to incorporate 64 access control and privacy protection, and to apply the framework to different application domains, such as health care, that involve sensitive data management to meet regulatory compliance requirements.
